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Abstract—Tor and hidden services have emerged as a practical
solution to protect user privacy against tracking and censorship.
At the same time, little is known about the lifetime and nature of
hidden services. Data collection and study of Tor hidden services
is challenging due to its nature of providing privacy. Studying the
lifetime of hidden services provides several benefits. For example,
it allows investigation of the maliciousness of domains based on
their lifetime. Short-lived hidden services are more likely not to
be legitimate domains, e.g., used by ransomware, as compared
to long-lived domains.
In this work, we investigate the lifetime of hidden services by
collecting data from a small (2%) subset of all Tor HSDir relays
in a privacy-preserving manner. Based on the data collected,
we devise protocols and extrapolation techniques to infer the
lifetime of hidden services. Moreover we show that, due to
Tor’s specifics, our small subset of HSDir relays is sufficient to
extrapolate lifetime with high accuracy, while respecting Tor user
and service privacy and following Tor’s research safety guidelines.
Our results indicate that a large majority of the hidden services
have a very short lifetime. In particular, 50% of all current Tor
hidden services have an estimate lifetime of only 10 days or less,
and 80% have a lifetime of less than a month.
I. INTRODUCTION
Only little is known about Tor’s hidden services, their na-
ture, and their lifetime. Yet, studying the lifetime (“longevity”)
of hidden services can provide several benefits: for example
knowledge about service lifetime provides insights into the
performance and resource allocation requirements of Tor’s
infrastructures, knowledge about the typical lifetime might be
an indicator of maliciousness of individual onion domains.
Short-lived hidden services are considered more likely not to
be legitimate domains, as compared to long-lived domains.
The distributed, anonymity-providing nature of Tor renders
any study about hidden services non-trivial and technically
challenging. To enable users to connect to hidden services
with anonymity, Tor employs a complex rendezvous protocol.
Hidden services announce themselves on a special subset of
all Tor relays, the so called Hidden Service Directory (HSDir)
relays. These relays, currently around 3, 000, store service
descriptors uploaded by each hidden service and reply to
user connection requests in a distributed fashion. Specifically,
each hidden service registers itself every day to a (pseudo-
)randomly chosen set of 6 HSDir relays. Only these 6 relays
know about the hidden service and user connection requests.
If the party conducting the study would have access to all
HSDir relays, a lifetime study of hidden services would
become trivial. The party would simply count the number of
days a hidden service descriptor is uploaded to any HSDir
relay. However, given the decentralized, volunteer-run nature
of Tor relays, such a straightforward approach is obviously
impossible. There will always be HSDir relays outside the
measuring party’s access, resulting in an incomplete view of
hidden services.
Besides such a purely technical challenge, there exist also
ethical challenges when conducting a study on Tor. Any study
collecting real-world data from Tor’s relays must consider im-
plications of data collection, storage, and analysis. Publishing
(statistical) information about real-world data and performing
the study itself must not de-anonymize individual parties.
Therefore, the recently established Tor Research Safety Board
reviews new research proposals and approves only projects
with minimal privacy risks and an expected benefit for the
Tor community.
This paper: We measure and analyze Tor’s hidden services
lifetime in a privacy-preserving fashion. First, we investigate
the effect of having access to only a fraction of HSDir
relays on the precision of hidden service lifetime estimation.
Surprisingly, we are able to show that access to even a small
fraction (≈ 2%) already allows lifetime prediction with high
precision, independent of the real distribution of lifetimes.
We then institute several changes to the Tor relay software.
First, with our software, a relay counts the number of ob-
servations of each individual hidden service descriptor and
user connection requests to this hidden service. To protect
anonymity of individuals and hidden services, we also design
and implement new techniques for multiple different parties
running multiple relays. At the end of a measuring epoch,
a lifetime histogram is computed in a privacy-preserving
manner. Following the standard rationale of secure multi-party
computation, each (potentially malicious) party running a set
of relays only learns the information from their set of relays
and the histograms, but nothing else. We store observation
and request counts with forward security. That is, if a relay
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is compromised by an adversary at some point, the adversary
will not learn count and request values from before the time
of compromise.
We have deployed a total of 80 modified relays on cloud
VMs, i.e., 2% of all HSDir relays. Our set of relays has
been separated into different entities, based on the affiliation
running the relay, different cloud providers, and different geo-
locations. Our modified relays were monitoring hidden service
and connection requests over a period of 180 days.
This paper makes the following major contributions:
• We design and implement new analysis, simulation, and
extrapolation techniques for Tor hidden service lifetime
estimation. These techniques allows us to infer lifetimes
with high accuracy using data collected from a small
number of HSDir relays.
• We design and implement a new protocol for multi-party,
privacy-preserving computation of lifetime histograms.
Therewith, curious HSDir relays do not learn anything
about hidden services besides what can be deduced from
histograms. Our protocol is significantly more efficient
than related approaches.
• We deployed 80 relays over a period of 180 days. Our
relays span over 3 different cloud platforms across USA
and Europe (9 cities from 5 countries).
• As an outlook, we discuss several new techniques to cope
with malicious adversaries which are dishonest regarding
their input and thus violate correctness of a measurement.
Our techniques are general and also apply to previous
work on measuring Tor properties.
Remark: We stress that technical details of our approach were
reviewed and approved by the Tor research safety board before
deployment.
II. BACKGROUND: HIDDEN SERVICES &
HIDDEN SERVICE DIRECTORIES
Tor does not only anonymize client origin, but also network
services by introducing the concept of hidden services (also
called onion services). Roughly speaking, by connecting to
a hidden service, neither the client nor an eavesdropping
adversary learn the service’s IP address and therewith location.
Hidden services have been used to protect both legitimate, le-
gal services for privacy conscious users (e.g., Associated Press,
CBC, or the Center for Public Integrity all using SecureDrop
through hidden services), but also for illicit purposes such as
drug and contraband markets and extortion. We briefly sum-
marize key properties of Tor’s hidden services. In particular,
we focus on the architecture of hidden services, how hidden
services are offered such that clients and service providers
can communicate. The Tor hidden services architecture is
composed of the following components:
• Server: computer running a service (e.g., a web server).
• Client: computer wishing to access the server.
• Introduction Points (IP): a set of Tor relays, chosen by
the hidden service server. They forward initial messages
between the server and the client’s Rendezvous Point.
• Rendezvous Point (RP): a Tor relay randomly chosen by
the client that will forward data between the client and
the server.
• Hidden Service Directories (HSDir): a set of Tor relays
chosen pseudo-randomly to store certain service informa-
tion.
Server. The first step for the server is to make its service
accessible. Once for each service, the server generates an
RSA key pair. The (truncated) SHA-1 digest of the resulting
public key is the Identifier of the hidden service, and the
.onion hostname is the Base-32 encoding of this identifier.
Typically, it is sufficient for clients to know the .onion
hostname to be able to connect to the server over Tor. However
before, the server registers its hidden service inside Tor. As
shown in Figure 1, the server randomly chooses a set of
Introduction Points and establishes Tor circuits with them
(step 1). After setting up circuits, the hidden service then
calculates two service descriptor-ids and determines several
HSDir relays, details below. The server uploads their list
of Introduction Points to those HSDir relays (step 2). The
following simple relations hold for the descriptor-ids:
descriptor-id = H(Identifier||secret-id-part)
secret-id-part = H(time-period||descriptor-cookie
||replica)
time-period = (current-time+
permanent-id-byte ∗ 86400/256)
/86400
Here, H denotes the SHA-1 hash function, Identifier
is the 80 bit truncated SHA-1 digest of the public key of the
hidden service. Descriptor-cookie is an optional 128
bit field which could be used for additional authorization such
that knowledge of the .onion is not sufficient to connect to
a hidden service.
Hidden services, i.e., their servers, change their HSDir re-
lays periodically. The time-period determines when each
descriptor-id expires, and the hidden service needs to
calculate Introduction Points and uploads them to the new
corresponding HSDir relays. To prevent descriptor-ids from
changing all at the same time, a permanent-id-byte is
also included in the calculations. The Replica index takes
values 0 or 1, and thus there exist two descriptor-ids.
The range of all possible descriptor-ids forms a ring, see
Figure 2. Additionally, each HSDir relay features a fingerprint,
the SHA-1 hash of their own public key. These fingerprints
allowing placing HSDir relays on the ring of descriptor-
ids, essentially dividing the ring into segments. Each hidden
service stores their Introduction Points with their descriptor-
id on three consecutive HSDir relays in the ring, so to a
total of six relays. Specifically, if a descriptor-id of a hidden
service falls between fingerprints of HSDir relays HSDirk−1
and HSDirk, then the Introduction Points will be stored on
relays HSDirk, HSDirk+1, and HSDirk+2.
Client. When a client wishes to connect to a hidden service,
they first need to compute the descriptor-id as above.
The client then contacts the corresponding HSDir relays (step
Client
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Fig. 1: Hidden service connection setup Fig. 2: Ring of descriptor-ids and HSDir relay fingerprints
3) by establishing a circuit to receive the list of the hidden
service’s Introduction Points. Then, the client first randomly
selects a Tor relay as its Rendezvous Point and establishes a
Tor circuit with it (step 4). The client connects to one of the
hidden service’s Introduction Points and asks to contact the
hidden service, announcing their Rendezvous Point (step 5).
Then, the Introduction Point forwards the Rendezvous Point
to the hidden services (step 6). Finally, the hidden service
establishes a circuit to the Rendezvous Point, and hidden
service server and client start communicating.
III. MEASUREMENT CONFIGURATION
Our key idea is to deploy several modified HSDir relays
within the Tor network to collect partial statistics. These
HSDir relays follow the standard Tor protocol specification
with only one difference: the relays maintain counters for
all descriptor-ids observed. Whenever descriptor-id is
uploaded to one of our HSDir relays, this relay will increase its
local counter for descriptor-id by one. After some time,
which we divide into epochs, all of our HSDir relays jointly
produce a histogram of the hidden service lifetime during that
epoch. The histogram will capture how many hidden services
were observed on how many days. Computing the histograms
should be both precise and privacy-preserving. In this section,
we discuss our approach on how to measure with precision.
We will present the privacy-preserving computation aspects in
the following section.
Deploying a large number of modified Tor relays such that
nearly all relays in the Tor network are our modified relays
would obviously result in high precision for the estimated
lifetime and popularity. However, deploying large numbers of
relays clearly incurs high (monetary) costs. As described later
in Section VI, we use several different cloud providers and
deploy Tor relays on cloud VMs. The costs of running the
measurement is thus proportional to the number of relays we
deploy.
Therefore, a first question is how many relays result in what
level of precision for our estimation. In the following, we
present our approach to calculate the trade-off between the
number of relays (costs) on the one hand and the precision of
lifetime and popularity estimation on the other via simulation.
A. Simulation Methodology
We simulate the behavior of hidden services uploading
their descriptors to the HSDirs. As such, every hidden service
chooses six HSDir based on their fingerprint ring, following
Tor’s specification. Given that we have the ground truth for
the lifespan of each hidden service, we are able to analyze the
effect of the number of controlled HSDirs on the statistical
error, for each lifespan d. Thus, the estimated lifespan le(i)
for HSi(i = 1, 2, . . . n) using the counts from all controlled
HSDirs can be written as.
le(i) =
(∑
k=1,2..Nc
Ck,i
)
×Nt
Nc × 6 ,
where Ck,i is the counter value for the hidden service HSi
(measured at HSDirk), Nc is the number of controlled
HSDirs (e.g., 80), and Nt is the total number of HSDirs (e.g.,
3,000) on Tor. By dividing the sum of counters by Nc, we
can estimate what would have been obtained if we measured
the results using all HSDirs. During an epoch of 24 hours, six
HSDirs store descriptors at the same time, so we divide the
results by six to estimate lifespan, accounting for the over-
count at those HSDirs.
Error Estimation. The error for each hidden service, E(i), is
calculated as the difference between the estimated and actual
lifespan. The total average error rate, Eavg is calculated by
integrating these errors. Let la(i) be the actual lifespan for
HSi from the initial phase. The error and total average error
are calculated as follows:
E(i) = |le(i)− la(i)|/la(i), (1)
Eavg(Nc) = [
∑
i=1,2..Nt
E(i)]/Nt. (2)
Using a simulator we experiment with various variables to
compute the above error rates and decide an acceptable
measurement setting.
Simulation Setting. During the simulation, we maintain the
total number of HSDirs in the network at 3,000 and the
number of hidden services at 60,000, which is the number
of unique hidden services per day (16). In addition, since the
main purpose of this simulation is to discover the correlation
between the number of controlled HSDirs and the error of the
statistical results, we do not consider users’ behavior in the
simulation. The number of HSDirs controlled between 30 to
300, in steps of 30 (i.e., Nc = 30, 60, 90, . . . , 300).
Lifespan estimation using HSDirs. Figure 3 shows the
distribution of the actual and the estimated lifespan in our
simulations with 30 and 300 controlled HSDirs. The actual
lifespan (blue bars) is densely set following a given normal
random distribution, and the estimated lifespan (red bars) looks
rough as it is estimated from the counts collected from the
controlled HSDirs. Comparing the left and right graphs, the
actual lifespan of both graphs are observed to be similar, but
the estimated lifespan varies (per the variance or frequency of
the estimated values). This difference occurs because the range
of counter values to be collected can be widened when the
number of the controlled HSDirs is large and the range of the
estimated lifespan also widens together. In the right graph, the
difference between the estimated and actual lifespan is small,
which means that the accuracy of lifespan estimation is high.
Figure 4 shows numerically a comparison between the
estimated and the actual lifespans. The X-axis represents the
calculated error of the hidden service using the above equation,
while the Y-axis is the number of hidden services that have the
corresponding error. In this graph, we can see that when NC
is 300, more than 90% of HSs have an error of less than 0.2,
while when NC is 30 only about 50% have error of less than
0.2. This shows that the accuracy of the accumulated results
can vary depending on how many HSDirs are used to collect
information among all HSDirs.
B. Determining the number of controlled HSDirs
The previous experiments have empirically demonstrated
that the number of controlled HSDirs can directly impact the
measurement error. Based on these observations, we measure
how Eavg varies according to the number of HSDirs. It is
clear that a large number of HSDirs ensures high accuracy in
the statistics, but it is necessary to find an optimal value for
realistic, safe, and practical measurements.
As shown in Figure 5, the average error rate Eavg changes
as we we change the value of Nc. As the number of the
controlled HSDirs is increased, the estimated lifespan becomes
more accurate and the error rate decreases. Through this
experiment, we calculate the optimal number of controlled
HSDirs to be between 60 and 90, as it is an appropriate
compromise between cost and accuracy.
C. Determining the number of contolled HSDirs for various
distributions
In the previous section, we investigated the optimal value
of the number of controlled HSDirs, assuming that the hid-
den services have a lifespan following a normal distribution.
However, assuming that it follows a normal distribution in the
absence of a baseline for the true distribution of the lifespan of
the hidden service introduces additional errors. Therefore, we
have also experimented with a case where the lifespan of the
hidden service is distributed along a uniform and exponential
distribution.
Figure 6 shows the average of errors of the lifespan estima-
tion with various random distributions. We note a difference in
the individual error rate, although the overall trend is similar to
our previous results. Through these extended experiments, we
also find that using the number of controlled HSDirs between
60 and 90 is an acceptable setting, regardless of the distribution
of hidden services’ lifespan.
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Fig. 3: The distributions of actual and estimated lifespan. Note
that the distributions of actual lifespan in both cases are almost
similar, but the distributions of estimated lifespan are quite
different.
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 0  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9  1
C
D
F
Error
NC = 30
NC = 300
Fig. 4: CDF for hidden service errors. Note that when using
300 HSDirs for the lifespan estimation only less than 10%
of HSs have an error over 0.2, while when using 30 HSDirs
about half of HSs have error larger than 0.2
 0.06
 0.08
 0.1
 0.12
 0.14
 0.16
 0.18
 0.2
 0.22
 0.24
 0.26
30 60 90 12
0
15
0
18
0
21
0
24
0
27
0
30
0
E
av
g
Nc
Fig. 5: The average expected error for various number of
controlled HSDirs.
In the next section, we describe a privacy-preserving proto-
col that we use to encrypt the lifespan counts for each hidden
services, while also hiding the raw hidden services addresses.
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IV. PRIVACY-PRESERVING HISTOGRAMS
We now turn to protecting privacy during our measurement
study and begin by discussing this paper’s threat model.
Essentially, our work should not allow an adversary to learn
more sensitive information than if they would run several
HSDir relays themselves.
A. Threat Model
As of today, a malicious party (an adversary) running
any HSDir relay in Tor is able to get limited information
about descriptor-ids and client requests and therewith hidden
services’ lifetimes and popularities.
Our experiment on the Tor network produces a histogram
of hidden service lifetimes. Informally, our privacy intuituion
is that our experiment must not enable the adversary to
learn more than the histograms and all data recorded by the
adversary controlled HSDir relays.
This should also hold for our own HSDir relays which we
deploy inside the Tor network using several cloud providers.
Some relays could be compromised by an adversary. One
could even argue that some members of our team behaves
adversarial (and thus we have separated control over all relays
to 3 different parties, see Section V).
More formally, we assume that an adversary has compro-
mised a subset S of our HSDir relays. Still, the adversary
should not learn anything besides
• what each compromised HSDir relay in S observes.
Specifically, this comprises service descriptors and client
requests.
• the histogram of lifetimes produced in the end.
An adversary either compromising some of our relays our
simply running relays themselves can obviously combine the
view of their relays and possibly infer additional information.
As the Tor network is based on volunteering, an adversary can
participate at any time, and there is no way to prevent such
kind of data leakage. The goal of our security mechanisms is
to not introduce additional issues.
As a side note we remark that an adversary compromising
a relay might have full system access to the computer running
the relay. This might include the power to dump the computer’s
memory, read swap data etc. Against such an adversary it is
difficult to protect sensitive data, e.g., service descriptors, from
before the time of compromise. To offer at least some security,
we will use techniques to hide previously stored information.
B. A New Protocol for
Privacy-Preserving Histograms
We now describe technical details of our protocol which
computes histograms in a privacy-preserving way. The main
setup of data collection and aggregation is based on and
extends the second variant of the PrivEx (9) protocol. PrivEx
introduces intuitive distributed encryption and multi-party
computation for a single count and has already served as the
basis for other work, too (14). In the following, we present
the main protocol steps. To avoid confusion, we use the same
notation and terminology (TKS and DC) as PrivEx.
1) Overview: We separate trust into multiple different,
mutually distrusting parties. Each party runs one Tally Key
Server (TKS) and several Data Collection (DC) node. Each DC
node in our setting is an HSDir relay. During data collection,
each DC node stores a count, the number of times a hidden
service has registered its service descriptor at this DC node.
To realize that, each DC manages a set of (key, value) pairs,
where the key is the hash of a .onion hostname, and the value
is the count for that .onion hostname. We store counts using
additively homomorphic encryption, see below.
After some time interval (an epoch), all DCs send their
(key,value) pairs to their corresponding TKS. A TKS homo-
morphically adds values (counts) reported for the same key
(hostname). This is done only for safety reasons, such that
not all measurements of a DC are in case that DC crashes
within our multiple-month study.
At the end of the whole data collection phase, i.e., after
several epochs, all TKS interactively compute a lifetime his-
togram with privacy. In our setup with multiple distrustful
parties, computation resembles standard cryptographic multi-
party computation.
Cryptography Overview. During initialization, our protocol
uses a standard distributed key generation technique to gener-
ate a (private, public) key pair for an additively homomorphic
encryption scheme. Here, the public key will be known to
everybody, but not the private key. The private key is split
into shares, and each TKS knows one share of the private
key. To decrypt a ciphertext, all TKS need to cooperate and
contribute to the decryption.
The DCs use this public key to encrypt the counts during
the data collection phase. We employ the additively homo-
morphic variant of Elgamal encryption with plaintexts “in the
exponent”. Thanks to the additively homomorphic property,
each TKS homomorphically adds counts until the end of
the data collection phase. During an aggregation phase, all
TKSs homomorphically add their individual sums to com-
pute encrypted aggregated sums. To separate sums for the
corresponding .onion service, each TKS shuffles the list of
aggregated sums.
Finally, each individual sum is decrypted by each TKS
contributing with to each decryption with its share of the
private key.
We use a public bulletin board (PBB) for storage of all
the intermediary and final results of the computations that are
accessible to all DC and TKS nodes, to read from and write
to. To mitigate against misbehavior and data manipulation by
the PBB, all data can be either signed by the publishers, or the
PBB can act as an append only database or ledger. We use a
private git data repository where each DC and TKS have their
own private key to publish their data.
After this overview, we now turn to technical details.
2) Technical Details:
Initial Setup. Initially, all parties agree on an asymmetric
key. We use Elgamal’s additively homomorphic variant, as
distributed key generation for Elgamal is straightforward. All
operations below take place in a group where the Decisional
DiffieHellman assumption is believed to hold, e.g., the group
of quadratic residues QRp of Zp, where p = 2 · q + 1 is a
large safe prime. For any a $← QRp, g = a2 is a generator of
QRp.
During an initial setup stage, parties jointly agree on a
public key using the following standard distributed key gener-
ation technique. Each party i picks a random value ai
$← Zq
to be used as its share of a joint private key. The share of
the joint public key is calculated, Ai = gai . To mitigate
against an adversarial party, each party first publishes a hash-
based commitment to Ai. After all parties have published their
commitments, they open them to reveal Ai. An alternative
would be to commit to Ai and publish the commitment
together with a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of ai.
Next, the joint public key A is calculated as A =
∏
iAi.
Encryption of a message m ∈ Zq is EA(r,m) = (gr, Ar ·
hm)
for a random value r ∈ Zq and two generators g and h.
Note the encryption’s additively homomorphism, as we have
EA(r1,m1) = (g
r1 , Ar1 · hm1)
EA(r2,m2) = (g
r2 , Ar2 · hm2)
Da(EA(r1,m1)) ·Da(EA(r2,m2)) = Da(EA(r1 + r2,m1 +m2))
Our additive variant of Elgamal encryption supports re-
encryption. That is, for a ciphertext C = (C1, C2) = (gr,
Ar · hm), we can re-encrypt to C ′ = (Cr′1 , C2 · Ar
′
) for a
randomly chosen r′ ∈ Zq.
Decryption of ciphertext tuple (C1, C2) is,
Da(C1, C2) = DLogh(C2/C1
a).
So to decrypt, you have to calculate a discrete logarithm. Given
that the size of message space is small in our experiments, it
can be calculated using “brute-force”. A count value cannot
be larger than the duration of the data collection phase d.
Even if we control all HSDirs in the Tor network, the total
count cannot be larger than 6 · d. For further optimization
and more efficient calculation of discrete logarithm, other
general approaches such as baby-step giant-step (23), Pollard’s
kangaroo algorithm (22) or Pollard’s rho algorithm (21) can
be employed.
Note that secret key a is not known to anybody. Yet, to
enable joint decryption, we make use of the property that each
party i knows share ai, and a =
∏
i ai. So, during decryption
of ciphertext (C1, C2), party i computes intermediate value
vi = C2/C
ai
1 and sends the result to party i+ 1. Party i+ 1
takes vi and computes vi+1 = vi/C
ai+1
1 and so on. Eventually,
the last party publishes the recovered plaintext.
Data Collection. Each DC stores a simple database of (key,
value) pairs. When receiving the descriptor of a hidden service,
the DC verifies whether the hash of the .onion address already
exist in the database. If it exists, the DC increments its
counter value by calculating EA(r, 1) = (gr, Ar · h) and
homomorphically adding EA(r, 1) to the current encrypted
count in its database. If the hash of the .onion address does not
exist in the database, the DC creates a new entry and stores
EA(r, 1) for this hash. We use an epoch of 24 hours to consider
a new hidden service. After a hidden service is observed by
a DC c times, the value for the counter will consequently be
(gr, Ar · hc).
Aggregation. At the end of an epoch, each DC publishes
a commitment of their encrypted counts to the PBB. After
all DCs have committed, they open their commitment by
publishing their encrypted counts to the PBB, i.e., for each
onion address they publish the encrypted count (H(onion),
(gr, Ar · hc)). After opening commitments, the TKSs verify
counts against commitments and if successful continue oper-
ation.
At the end of the data collection phase, one TKS, e.g., TKS1
sums up all encrypted counts by componentwise multiplica-
tion of ciphertexts belonging to the same H(onion). TKS1
publishes result R which is a list of ciphertexts C = EA(r,
c)). All other TKS re-do this computation and check TKS1’s
R. If it matches their computation, they continue.
Shuffling. The last step is that all TKS engage in a privacy-
preserving shuffle of R. Therewith, they will break the connec-
tion between H(onion) and the encrypted count correspond-
ing to H(onion).
Specifically, TKS1 starts by computing and publishing a
random permutation R′ of R where all ciphertexts in R are
re-encrypted. TKS2 computes another random permutation R′′
of R′ and publishes R′′, and so on.
To protect against malicious TKSs, we use standard zero-
knowledge proofs of knowledge of correctness of shuffles (per-
mutation and re-encryption). That is, each TKS does not only
publish their shuffle, but publishes their shuffle together with
a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. There are several (very
efficient) variants of such zero-knowledge proofs (19; 3; 11).
However, we use a simple cut-and-choose implementation of a
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of correctness of a shuffle
working as follows. For a given sequence R of ciphertexts,
1) TKSi computes and publishes two permutations R0 and
R1 with re-encrypted ciphertexts of R.
2) TKSi also computes the hash H(R0, R1), where “,” is
an unambiguous pairing of inputs.
3) If the first bit of H(R0, R1) is 0, then TKSi publishes
details of how to permute R to R0 together with all
random coins r used during re-encryption.
4) If the first bit of H(R0, R1) is 1, then TKSi publishes
permutation from R to R1 together with the random
coins.
The above four steps are repeated ` times, resulting in a zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge of correctness of a shuffle in
the random oracle model, and with a (statistical) soundness
error of 2−`. A reasonable value of ` is, e.g., ` = 40.
Decryption. After the last shuffle has been published and its
proof verified, this last shuffle is then decrypted ciphertext by
ciphertext. As described above, each TKS partially decrypts
each ciphertext. The last TKS publishes the list of hc values.
Given that each count cannot be larger than the duration of the
study, we use brute-force to calculate the discrete logarithm,
but any of the faster, general algorithms mentioned above are
possible, too.
3) Security Analysis and Discussion: The distributed key
generation mechanism guarantees establishing a public-private
key pair against malicious adversaries. Committing and open-
ing the public part of a key share, or using a zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge as PrivEx, is a standard technique to
compute an unbiased key pair.
For simplicity, we use a k-out-of-n approach for our dis-
tributed key generation where k = n. While it is easy to
implement, it has several drawbacks. For example, if any of the
parties aborts the protocol, no encrypted data can be decrypted.
As an alternative for more robustness, one could use k < n
approaches. Note, however, that any multi-party computation
protocol requires a honest majority.
To comply with Tor’s standard ethics we do not store the
raw hidden services at any point. Each DC calculates the
hash of an onion service, H(onion). This mitigates against
leaking the hidden services address to an adversary without
prior knowledge of the onion address. However, it does not
protect against an adversary with prior knowledge of a hidden
service.
Along the same lines as distributed key generation, aggre-
gation also uses a commit-and-prove approach (5) to securely
compute sums in the presence of malicious adversaries.
There is, however, still one constraint. A malicious adver-
sary can lie about their input, i.e., their encrypted counts. That
is, a malicious adversary can publish and prove encryptions
of counts that are not reflecting the really observed counts.
In the specific context of our computations, it is important
to point out consequences. For example, if 2 out of 3 parties
are malicious, they could both commit to and publish only
encryptions of 0. As a result, the adversary would learn a
random permutation of the benign party’s counts.
In general, it is difficult to protect against adversaries lying
about their input. Yet, in contrast to related work, we discuss
several strategies for mitigation. Besides using differential
privacy, we dedicate Section IV-C to more details.
If we assume adversaries with the only constrain that they
do not cheat about their input, than the above protocol is secure
in that an adversary only learns the histogram (and everything
they can derive from their own view), but nothing else about
the other parties’ input.
C. Protection Against Dishonest Adversary
In this section, we describe and discuss several first ideas
to detect and mitigate against dishonest parties (DC and TKS)
who lie and report fake counts. Dishonest DCs and TKSs can
skew the histograms and final counts by reporting fake values.
Approach 1. The rationale behind our first approach is that
parties control each other and verify their output. Due to the
random distribution of descriptor-ids on HSDir relays, there
is a non-zero probability that the same descriptor-id is placed
on HSDir relays of multiple parties. Increasing the number of
HSDir relays increases this probability.
Now let P1, . . . , Pn be parties, with at most one being
malicious. Each party controls their own subset of HSDir
relays of size x. Parameter x must be chosen carefully in
advance such that it gives certain properties on the precision
of the mapping between counts and hidden service lifetime
later. The protocol goes as follows.
1) Parties P1, . . . , Pn enter the data collection phase at the
same time. During measurement, each party individually
and independently of other parties counts occurrences of
hidden services as before.
2) At a predetermined deadline, all parties cease measure-
ment. Each party Pi computes a histogram histogrami
of counts.
3) Parties engage in an interactive protocol.
a) Each party Pi publishes a commitment to its his-
togram histogrami.
b) After all parties have committed, they open com-
mitments and publish their histogram histogrami.
c) For any pair of histograms histogrami and
histogramj , parties locally compute histogram
distances D(histogrami, histogramj). There are
several distances for histograms, e.g., Kullback-
Leibler, χ2 distance, Earth Moving Distance,
quadratic form distance, and combinations of
that. In any case, the output of this step
are numbers d1 = D(histogram1, histogram2),
d2 = D(histogram1, histogram3), . . . , dn−1 =
D(histogramn−1, histogramn). For simplicity, as-
sume d1 < . . . < dn−1.
Now, the “true” histogram is histogram1. The rationale is that
histograms of honest, non-malicious parties will be closer than
the histograms of a honest party and a malicious.
Obviously, for this mitigation strategy to work in a straight-
forward manner, the number of HSDir relays for each party
must be as high as the number of relays for the set of all parties
in the previous section. However future work could investigate
trade-offs between the choice of x and a compromise between
security, cost, and precision of results.
Approach 2. In this approach, each party creates a set of
“private” hidden services, i.e., without announcing them to
other parties. By running these hidden services, each party
knows exactly which HSDir relays should have hosted their
own descriptors-ids at any time. To verify if another party is
honest, each party can ask for the decryption of the count of
their hidden service after proving that they own the hidden
service’s corresponding private key.
More formally, each party Pi owns k RSA (private, public)
key pairs (d, e) and runs k private hidden services onioni.
During initialization, each party commits to their k onion ser-
vices. After data collection, each party then open commitments
and proves the ownership of each of their onioni using the
private key.
After the ownership of a hidden service is verified, each
DCi reveals their count for onioni. If onioni was online all
the time, everybody knows the exact count of any hidden
service for each DC using the DC’s fingerprint. If count
reported from a DC diverges from its expectation, the DC has
cheated. In some sense, this technique is like a spot checking
technique for onion services.
This approach requires that parties actually run their onion
services and not falsely blame other parties. To prove that
their services were really online, one party could reveal an
onion service to a subset of the other parties which would then
regularly check availability of the onion service and serve as
witnesses later on.
Approach 3. Considering that an adversary can detect the
honeypots, another approach is to verify the counts of a set of
all hidden services. This is a variant of the second approach.
We sample a random set of all online hidden services, and
query each entity for their corresponding counts. In this
method, the adversary is not able to report fake values on
Country City Cloud Provider Count
USA City 1 1 Private 20
USA Chicago Vultr 2
USA Dallas Vultr 2
USA Atlanta Vultr 2
USA Miami Vultr 2
Germany Frankfurt Vultr 6
UK London Vultr 6
France Paris Online SAS 32
Netherlands Amsterdam Online SAS 8
TABLE I: The distribution of our relays per country, city,
and cloud provider. We chose diverse location for the relays,
both for security reasons and also to help the Tor network by
contributing relays and bandwidth.
the known hidden services that do not belong to the verifiers.
Each verifier checks the lifespan of any hidden service that is
uploaded to his HSDir, by performing a non-intrusive probing.
Such probing is carried out by establishing a connection to the
hidden service, without making an HTTP request. Imagine
that in a dynamic HSDir circle formation, the probability
that an honest HSDir reports a count outside the threshold
is p1. Therefore, after i iterations of sampling hidden services
lifespan, each TKS can establish a level of confidence on the
correctness of the counts. In this model, each TKS entity can
set their own threshold δ and only consider the counts that
meet their security requirements.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND DEPLOYMENT
To ensure that we are not compromising the security and
privacy of Tor, we took the following procedures. We setup
a website detailing our project, methodology, fingerprints of
our relays, and the identities of the research team. We limit
the bandwidth of our relays to 250KB/s, to prevent acquiring
the Guard flag. Additionally, we disable the egress traffic
to the Internet from our relays, to avoid acquiring the Exit
flag. The Exit nodes are specially important component of the
Tor network, because they have access to the traffic (if not
encrypted). They are also a target of abuse complaints, since
their IP is listed as the source of connection to any Internet
domain. Furthermore, if the same entity is chosen as both the
Guard node and Exit node, he can perform network correlation
attack and de-anonymize Tor users. Therefore, we listed all
of our relays as one Effective Family, to prohibit two of our
relays to be chosen in any one circuit. This ensures that our
relays only serve as Middle relays and HSDirs inside the Tor
network.
In the following section, we describe our implementation
and deployment of the privacy preserving data collection and
analytics. We took the procedures necessary to ensure the
security and privacy of the data collected.
We deployed 80 relays that were managed by three different
teams, two from the USA and another one from Europe. We
divided our relays between the teams at different geolocations
for security and privacy reasons. 40 relays (20 VM) were
managed by Entity 1, 20 relays (10 VM) managed by Entity
Fig. 7: The geolocation map of our relays.
2, and 20 relays (10 VM) by Entity 3. We hosted two relays
per VM instance. We used a combination of private and public
cloud to host our relays. 20 relays (10 VM) were hosted on
private cloud, 20 relays (10 VM) on Vultr cloud provider, and
40 relays (20 VM) on Online SAS. We chose these two cloud
providers because of low cost, and that both are in the top 5
cloud providers used by the Tor relays. These providers have
data centers in multiple geolocations, allowing us to distribute
our relays, both for security reasons and also to help the Tor
network. The 20 private cloud relays, were hosted in City 1,
USA; 32 Online SAS relays in Paris, France; 8 Online SAS
relays in Amsterdam, Netherlands, 6 Vultr relays in Frankfurt,
Germany; 6 Vultr relays in London, UK; 2 Vulr relays in
Miami, USA; 2 Vultr relays in Atlanta, USA; 2 Vultr relays
in Chicago, USA; and 2 Vultr relays in Dallas, USA. Table I
summarizes the distribution of our relays per country, city, and
cloud provider. Please note that the count is the number of the
relays, not the number of VM instances. There are two relays
per VM instance, since only two relays can run on a single IP
address, per Tor policies.
We made modifications to the Tor software to log the hash
of the hidden services and the time they were uploaded to
the HSDirs into an in-memory database. For privacy and
security reasons, we used the Redis in-memory database,
with the persistence storage disabled. As a result, as soon
as the machine is restarted, all unencrypted data that resides
in the memory will be deleted. We implemented the privacy
preserving counting and aggregation in Python. At the end of
each 24 hour epoch, the Python program reads the data from
the Redis database, writes the encrypted data to disk, and
flushes the databases. At the end of each cycle, we publish
the data to the PBB. We used a private git server as our
PBB, to collect data from all DCs. When the data collection
phase is over, all TKS aggregate the counts, calculate their
contributions and publish it to the PBB as well.
Note that the encrypted data on the DCs, cannot be de-
crypted until all parties participate. The reason behind using a
k out of n (where k = n) encryption technique is to ensure the
security of the collected data. Even if parties are coerced in
disclosing their private keys, as long as one party deletes his
private key, the encrypted data cannot be decrypted. Moreover,
both our DCs and the TKSs reside in different geolocations
with different jurisdictions, which makes the coercion of the
private keys less practical.
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Fig. 8: Expected counts at HSDirs as a function of lifespan.
As we can see, 95% of the expected values are within two
standard deviation of the mean expected value.
Figure 7 depicts the geolocation distribution of our HSDir
relays. As evident, we distributed our servers to different
geolocations for security and privacy reasons. Furthermore, we
helped the Tor network by contributing relays and bandwidth
at different data servers.
VI. RESULTS
In this section, we discuss the results and findings of our
study. As mentioned previously, we deployed 80 HSDirs over
a range of public and private cloud providers. Our experiments
lasted for 180 days, from September 15, 2017 to March 15,
2018. During this period, we collected the lifespan counts for
317090 hidden services from our relays.
We use simulations to find the expected observation counts
as a function of the lifespan of a hidden service for the
duration of the our study. Figure 8 shows the expected values
for lifespan of hidden services. We calculate the mean, one
standard deviation, two standard deviations and 95% of the
values from the mean value. The distribution of expected
counts follows the bell curve distribution. As we can see, 95%
of the expected values are within two standard deviations of
the mean expected value.
Figure 9 plots the distribution of the extrapolated lifespan
and the raw lifespan counts from the HSDirs. As we can see
around 50% of the collected hidden services have count of 1.
However, in the extrapolated lifespan graph, the majority of
the hidden services have an estimated lifespan of 2 days. This
is because if a hidden service has a count of 1, it can be, with
a high probability, a hidden service with lifespan of 1, 2, 3,
or higher. However, if a hidden service is counted 2 times, it
can only have a minimum lifespan of 2 days. This imbalance
between the estimated lifespan and the observed counts for
values less than 10, explains the different distribution shape
between the raw lifespan counts and the estimated lifespan of
hidden services.
Figure 10 depicts the CDF of the observed counts and the
estimated lifespan. More than 60% of hidden services are
Fig. 9: Distribution of the estimated lifespan and raw lifespan
counts from the HSDirs.
Fig. 10: CDF of distribution of the estimated lifespan and raw
lifespan counts from the HSDirs.
observed 2 times or less on the HSDirs. At the same time,
more than 50% of the hidden services, have an estimated
lifespan of less than 10 days, where 40% of them are online
for only less than a week. Our results show that a large
majority of hidden services, have short lifespan, less than
a few weeks. Our findings confirms the results of previous
work (20), regarding the number of hidden services with short
life span. However, the previous work did not consider any
safeguards, and their results were based on the probing of the
collected onion address from their HSDirs, which is against
Tor user agreement. In contrast, our work does not store any
information about the onion services. Furthermore, we do not
perform any probing of the hidden services. Our results rely on
the extrapolation of lifespan based on the privacy-preserving
aggregated counts from a small number of hidden service (2%
of the hidden services).
Without a holistic view of all the hidden services (i.e.,
controlling all HSDirs), it is difficult and non-trivial to draw
conclusions on the churn of the hidden services. However, by
using the hidden services statistics that the Tor project collects
from all relays and the lifespan of hidden services, it can be
inferred that the hidden services have a high churn. A possible
explanation for such short-lived hidden services with high
churn can be the dynamics and behavior of the applications
that use hidden services. For example, OnionShare, a secure
and private file sharing that uses Tor hidden services, creates
a new random hidden service address for each file transfer. As
soon as the file is downloaded by the recipients, the hidden
service is discarded.
VII. RELATED WORK
Previous work looking at hidden services (20), did not
consider any safeguards, and their results were based on the
probing of the collected onion address from their HSDirs,
which is clearly against Tor user agreement. In contrast, our
work does not store any information about the onion services.
Furthermore, we do not perform any probing of the hidden
services.
In this section, we review the related work on study of Tor
hidden services, and advancements in the privacy preserving
data collection and analytics.
One of the first studies on the Tor network by McCoy
et al. (18), collected data from the network by participating
and contributing relays to the Tor network. The authors were
studying three main questions: “How is Tor being used?”,
“How is Tor being mis-used?”, and “Who is using Tor?”.
Although such research questions and their answers are im-
portant, unfortunately, the authors did not use the required
safeguards to protect the privacy of users, and mitigate against
its compromise. Another example of studies looking at Tor and
hidden services that does not implement security and privacy
safeguards is (20), where authors collect information about
hidden services by setting up HSDirs. Additionally, the authors
actively probe the collected hidden services for content. Such
work, have been widely criticized by other researchers (24)
and the Tor Project. As a result tools such as ExperimenTor (2)
and Shadow (13) were introduced, for researchers to experi-
ment with simulated Tor network. As a measure to prevent
future unethical work, the Tor Research Safety Board (1) was
established to review the research projects studying the Tor
network, to ensure such works do not harm users’ privacy.
In the next section we will further discuss the Tor Research
Safety Board.
One of the early works on privacy preserving data collection
and study of the Tor network, specially hidden services, is a
work by the Tor team (12) to collect and count the number of
unique hidden services. The authors use differential privacy,
controlled noise addition to the statistics, and limiting accuracy
to a certain granularity via binning. However, this work does
not study the lifespan, or the nature of hidden services and how
they are used. This is mainly because reporting such statistics,
might harm the privacy of individual Tor users.
The closest study to our work is PrivEx (9), which our
privacy preserving counting protocol is based upon. In this
work, the authors introduce two variants for secure counting.
One with a shared secret key and another one that relies on
multi-party computation. Our work uses the second variant.
The authors implement and deploy their protocol to collect and
study egress traffic from Tor, and case study the popularity of
certain Internet website in different locations. Such work can
be used to investigate the censorship of content in different
locations, in a privacy preserving manner. PrivCount (14) is
another work that relies on PrivEx, for measuring the Tor
network designed with user privacy as a primary goal. It
aggregates the collected data from different Tor relays to
produce differentially private outputs. Another work that uses
shuffling of the data to hide relations between the elements
and counts is PSC (10), which is a work on private set union
cardinality (8).
Another work (15) uses Tor circuit and website fingerprint-
ing techniques from the middle relays to detect the hidden
services popularity and usage. Furthermore, the authors use
their fingerprinting technique to study the popularity of a social
networking hidden service, by setting up middle relays in the
Tor network. The authors demonstrate the possibility of such
passive study in a privacy preserving manner from the middle
relays. In another work (17), the authors introduce Histor,
which relies on differential privacy to collect and analyze
information about Tor statistics.
Privacy preserving techniques are also being used in ma-
chine learning and deep learning algorithms for secure ag-
gregation of high-dimensional data. For example, (4) allows
the computation of sum of large values at the honest-but-
curious and active adversary server, using the data from
different clients. Dolev et al. (7) introduce privacy preserving
algorithms for computation and performing search, fetch, and
range queries with the map-reduce framework. Related to our
work is also Prio (6), a privacy-preserving system for the
collection of aggregate statistics.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Tor and hidden services attracted a large user base in the
past few years. Investigating the hidden services dynamics and
pro-actively protecting them against abuse and subversion is
crucial in their success. Given the strict privacy requirement
and security assumption of Tor, it is important to consider the
implication of data collection and analysis in such infrastruc-
ture. In this paper, we demonstrate that it is possible to carry-
out a privacy-preserving study of hidden services longevity,
satisfying the Tor safety board requirements, yet obtaining
fairly accurate estimations.
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